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Afghanistan has taken a number of measures to combat tax evasion, however, 
they have not led to strengthening tax compliance in the country. This is due to 
the prevalence of economic crimes and the weaknesses in the state’s tax model.  
This article argues that these problems present the greatest hurdle in 
Afghanistan's quest towards a tax compliant society. By considering Kabul and 
Kandahar as its case study provinces, the article employs several methods to 
investigate tax evasion practices in the two provinces. In doing so, twelve 
indicators were developed as constructs to identify instances of tax evasion. The 
intention of this article is not to provide a comprehensive overview of estimates 
of every tax evasion component, nor of every tax evasion channel, but to 
specifically identify the common tax evasion practices in the two provinces. The 
findings suggest that as a result of the hierarchisation of the Afghan tribal 
society, the state co-opted tribal leaders and appointed them as local 
representatives, in charge of gathering taxes and duties from fellow tribesmen. 
This, the interviews revealed, has resulted in an obstacle for the state as the only 
sovereign with the monopoly to collect tax. Particularly in instances where the 
tribal leaders go far beyond their duty to collect tax and not remit it to the state. 
The resulting fragmented political structure that sits between local tribal 
leaders and state institutions have made it difficult for the Afghan government 
to get the local communities to remit taxes. Interviews with government 
officers, individuals and corporations in Kabul and Kandahar confirm that the 
rise of the underground economy due to poverty, warlord directives, contest 
between state and tribal leadership and insecurity has contributed to high 
incidences of smuggling, trade in narcotics, corruption, and money laundering. 
Political interference further prevents full disclosure on transactions and weak 
implementation of reporting standards.  
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Introduction   
“Given the strictness of Taliban regarding implementation of their rules 
and regulations, I think they raise more money from tax collection than 
the Afghan government”. 
Mohammddin, an Afghan. 
Afghanistan is an inward-looking society with a formal democracy and an 
elected president and parliament. Post conflict, the country depended 
almost entirely on foreign assistance for its security and the delivery of 
basic social services.1 It continues to rely on foreign aid as the Afghan 
government works to mobilize domestic sources of revenue. The 
capacity of the state to collect taxes in order to sustain its public wage 
bill, pay for both its recurrent and development expenditure as well as 
to secure basic public services however, is affected by the many different 
dimensions of tax evasion prevalent in the country.  
This arguably results out of the frequency of internal conflict that has led 
to increase in poverty and decline in per capita income,2 low tax morale, 
the underground economy, and non-state actors’ determination to 
challenge the state.3 The latter, in fact presents itself as the greatest 
barrier to tax compliance in Afghanistan. These factors combined with 
smuggling, corruption, trade in narcotics and rejection of the state 
model of governance and its tax architecture by the local Afghan tribal 
leaders has contributed to the decline of the Afghan economy and in 
turn, to tax leakages.  
The interplay between economic development and taxation has long 
since been established through the works of various scholars, such as 
 
1  Alessandro Monsutti, “Anthropologizing Afghanistan: Colonial and Postcolonial 
Encounters,” The Annual Review of Anthropology 42 (2013), 269-85 at 270.  
2  World Bank, “The World Bank in Afghanistan; Overview”. Available online at: 
<https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/afghanistan/overview> (Last 
accessed: 11.12.2019). 
3  James Putzel, “Why Development Actors Need a Better Definition of State 
Fragility,” Policy Directions, Crisis States Research Centre (2010).  
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Schumpeter,4 Tilly,5 Ormrod-Bonney,6 Waris7 and Latif.8 These scholars 
have argued that taxes play a very important role in the economic 
development of a country. They believe that taxes support state-
sponsored welfare programs tailored towards improving citizens’ living 
standards and in the distribution of wealth through the just allocation of 
resources.  
Therefore, the process of tax collection has become one of the most 
powerful discourses and themes in politics, economics, law, sociology 
and development studies to determine the sign of life of the modern 
post conflict state. Relatedly, good fiscal administration has also become 
the paradigm that links the process of state-building with the capacity of 
rulers to collect tax.9 Taxation, hence, is one of the few objective indices 
we have that measures the power, authority and legitimacy of the state 
to mobilise resources.10  
Taxation and tax reform, therefore, is central to state-building in 
Afghanistan for several reasons. First, due to conflict that persisted 
following 9/11, the state of Afghanistan could no longer sustain itself and 
thus sought for revenue externally in order to ensure sustainable 
funding for its social programmes, and for its public investments to 
promote economic development.  
Second, taxation is the main nexus that binds state officials with citizens. 
Not only can taxation enhance government accountability, it also 
provides a focal point around which citizens can mobilise to support, 
resist, and even propose tax policies. In other words, taxation is as 
 
4  Joseph Schumpeter, ‘The Crisis of the Tax State’, International Economic Papers 
4, 1918 (1954). 
5  Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital and European States: AD 990-1992 (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1990). 
6  Ormrod, Mark and Margaret Bonney, Crises, Revolutions and Self Sustained 
Growth: Essays in European Fiscal History, 1130-1830 (Stamford: Shaun Tyas, 
1999). 
7  Attiya Waris, Tax and Development (Nairobi: LawAfrica, 2013). 
8  Laila Abdul Latif, “Centralised Revenue Redistribution as a Potential Cause of 
Internal Conflict in Kenya,” Modern Africa: Politics, History and Society 04:01, 
(2016), 91-105.  
9  Schumpeter 1918, 1954; Tilly, 1990; and Latif, 2016. 
10  Di John, “Taxation, Resource Mobilisation and State Performance” Crisis States 
Working Papers Series No. 2, Working Paper no. 84 (2010).   
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constitutive of state formation11 as it is of citizen participation in budget 
making and delivery of social services.  
Third, taxation, particularly in the form of land and property taxes, 
customs and border collection can help increase the territorial reach of 
the Afghan state. The diversity of the tax base is a telling indicator of the 
ability of the Afghan state to engage with different sectors and regions 
and is indicative of the degree to which the state’s authority permeates 
society.  
Fourth, fiscal capacities are needed to build a legitimate state.12 Strong 
institutions and competent revenue authorities are therefore needed in 
order to ensure effective tax assessment and collection. Accordingly, tax 
legitimacy is critical to the existence of the post conflict Afghan state as 
it is the source of its support, it assists in state building and it promotes 
sovereignty and independence by reducing reliance on foreign aid.13  
Regrettably, however, in post conflict states, citizens of all classes have 
sought to avoid paying taxes and state fees,14 decreasing the state’s 
extractive capacity. It is therefore crucial to examine the tax collection 
capacity of the Afghan state in light of the fact that tax evasion practices 
in Afghanistan are now rampant.  
Broadly, the unwillingness to pay tax, the rise of the shadow economy 
during the wars, disdain towards regulation designed to curb market 
monopoly, the lack of loyalty towards public institutions and low tax 
morale have become the common factors associated with tax evasion in 
the present day Afghanistan. Further, a number of taxable activities 
remain untapped by the Afghan government as a result of high instances 
and dependency on cash and cash-based transactions that are difficult 
to track.15 Also, the lack of a formal system of documentation of self-
employed persons and their activities has led to tax leakages. Almost all 
of the self-employed persons are involved in tax evasion and 
underground economic activities in Afghanistan.  
 
11  Schumpeter 1918, 1954, and Tilly, 1990. 
12  Waris, 2013. 
13  Philippe Nonet, and Philip Seznick, Law and Society in Transition: Towards 
Responsive Law (USA: Routledge, 2017). 
14  Bratton, Michael, Robert B. Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi, Public opinion, democracy 
and market reform in Africa (UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
15  Interviews with government officers and private sector companies in Kabul and 
Kandahar. Interview transcripts on file with author.  
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These facts have not only been confirmed by previous empirical studies 
carried out by Maimbo,16 UNODC,17 the Special Inspector General for 
Afghanistan Reconstruction,18 Rosenberg,19 Integrity Watch 
Afghanistan20 and Rai,21 but also by the interviews carried out by the 
author. 
2. The Method of Inquiry and Structure  
This article provides an overview of the different tax evasion practices 
prevalent in two out of 34 provinces in Afghanistan. It does not intend 
to generalize the findings as applicable across the entire country due to 
its limited sample size.  
The aim was to identify the common and precise tax evasion practices in 
Kabul and Kandahar so as to present credible data that can then inform 
effective policy and legal changes to curb those tax evasion practices. 
Several methods have been used to investigate tax evasion in Kabul and 
Kandahar.  
The primary sources of information were obtained through textual 
analysis of cases, reports and laws alongside extensive desk-based 
literature review. This was followed by a qualitative analysis of data that 
was collected through 30 interviews with Civil Society Organizations 
(CSOs), Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), government officials, 
 
16  Samuel Munzele Maimbo, “The Money Exchange Dealers of Kabul: A Study of 
the Hawala System in Afghanistan” World Bank Working Paper No. 13 (2003), 4. 
Available online at: 
<http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/335241467990983523/pdf/26972
0PAPER0Money0exchange0dealers.pdf> (Last accessed: 11.12.2019) 
17  UNODC, “Financial Flows linked to the Illicit Production and Trafficking of 
Afghan Opiates” The Orange Paper (2008). 
18  SIGAR, “Quarterly Report to the United States Congress” (2012). Available 
online at: <https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/quarterlyreports/2012-10-30qr.pdf> (Last 
accessed: 11.12.2019). 
19  Matthew Rosenberg, “Afghan Government Faces Cash Crunch”. Available 
online at: <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/03/world/asia/afghan-
government-faces-cash-crunch-imf-says.html> (Last accessed: 11.12.2019). 
20  Integrity Watch Afghanistan, “Extractives for Sustainable Development” (2015). 
Available online at: 
<https://iwaweb.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Policy-Brief-Extractives-
forsustainable-development-in-Afghanistan.pdf> (Last accessed: 11.12.2019). 
21  Sakshi Rai, “Illicit Financial Flows: Perspectives from Developing Asian 
Countries” Centre for Budget and Governance Accountability, Policy Brief (2017). 
Available online at: <http://www.cbgaindia.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/06/ILLICIT-FINANCIAL-FLOWS-PERSPECTIVES.pdf> (Last 
accessed: 11.12.2019). 
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journalists and community leaders to understand Afghanistan’s tax 
structure and the instances that give rise to the rampant tax evasion 
practices. The comparative approach was utilized in order to understand 
whether the evasion practices identified in one province were also a 
determinant in the other.  
The tax evasion practices were defined in terms of twelve indicators that 
the author relied on to ask the research questions. The twelve indicators 
were defined in terms of (i) unreported transactions, (ii) lack of 
regulation, (iii) no thresholds on funds transfer, (iv) smuggling, (v) weak 
implementation of reporting standards, (vi) absence of information on 
ownership, (vii) trade in narcotics, (viii) corruption, (ix) insiders, (x) 
technology, (xi) money laundering and (xii) the underground economy 
as key determinants of tax evasion. 
The limitation encountered was in the lack of available data or sources 
that provide an indication of an estimate of the tax revenue that is lost 
to the Afghan state because of tax evasion practices; by individuals and 
corporations. The importance of identifying the tax evasion practices will 
assist the Afghan government in tracking and stopping such evasion. 
The intention of this article is not to provide a comprehensive overview 
of estimates of every tax evasion component, nor of every tax evasion 
channel, but to specifically identify the common tax evasion practices in 
the two provinces. 
Accordingly, the article is structured as follows: it begins by presenting 
the available information on tax evasion in policy papers, reports, 
working papers, journal articles and books. It considers the information 
provided from interviews conducted with government sources, the civil 
society, journalists and international organisations. The article then 
describes both the domestic and international initiatives taken by the 
Afghan government in curbing tax evasion. It then concludes by pointing 
out the current recommendations made by various domestic and 
international bodies that have conducted research relating to tax 
evasion in Afghanistan. 
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3. Tax Evasion Practices in Afghanistan 
Goldscheid argued that the state, society and taxation are 
interconnected.22 Such interconnectivity, explained Waris, is expressed 
in the tax bargain between the state and society that grants the state 
the fiscal legitimacy to collect and distribute tax.23  
Arguably then, the Afghan taxpayer’s morale is based on the confidence 
that they have in the governance of the post conflict Afghan state. This 
confidence can be assessed through a variety of ways in the evolving 
relationship between the state and society. At best, according to 
Backhaus, it is to be assessed through history.24 Barfield explains that 
Afghanistan’s history is defined by the historic relationship between the 
kinship-based solidarity of highlands and mountain range dwelling 
Afghans and the differentiated and hierarchical social organisations of 
the city life and urban civilization.25 The Afghan state comprises of 
sedentary rural tribal Pashtun communities, and non-Pashtun groups 
(such as the Tajiks, Hazaras, Uzbeks and others). 
The legitimization of tax, therefore, according to Mumford, can be seen 
through the culture of taxation prevalent in these groups, the method 
of collection, the ease, as well as the societal response to taxation.26 In 
this regard, Giustozzi and Noor explain and clarify for us the position of 
tax in the Afghan society.27  
According to them, as a result of the hierarchisation of the Afghan tribal 
society, the state co-opted tribal leaders and appointed them as local 
representatives, in charge of gathering taxes and duties from fellow 
tribesmen. This, the interviews revealed, has resulted in an obstacle for 
the state, as the only sovereign with the monopoly, to collect tax. 
Particularly in instances where the tribal leaders go far beyond their duty 
 
22  Rudolf Goldscheid, “A sociological approach to problems of public finance”, in 
R.A. Musgrave & A. T. Peacock (eds), Classics in the Theory of Public Finance. 
(London: Macmillan, 1962), 202-213.  
23  Waris, 2013. 
24  Backhaus Jurgen, “Fiscal sociology – what for”? American Journal of Economics 
and Sociology 61:01 (2002), 55-77.   
25  Jon W. Anderson, "Thomas Barfield, Afghanistan: A cultural and political 
history." Contemporary Islam 06:01 (2012), 95-97. 
26  Ann Mumford, Taxing culture: Towards a Theory of Tax Collection Law 
(Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2001).  
27  Antonio Giustozzi, and Noor Ullah, “Tribes and Warlords in Southern 
Afghanistan, 1980-2005” LSE: Crisis States Research Centre (2006). 
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to collect tax and not remit it to the state. The resulting fragmented 
political structure that sits between local tribal leaders and state 
institutions has made it difficult for the Afghan government to get the 
local communities to remit taxes.28  
Interviews with government officers, individuals and corporations in 
Kabul and Kandahar confirm that the rise of the underground economy, 
due to poverty, warlord directives, contest between state and tribal 
leadership and insecurity, has contributed to high incidences of 
smuggling, trade in narcotics, corruption, and money laundering. 
Political interference further prevents full disclosure on transactions and 
weak implementation of reporting standards.  
The next sections reveal more information on these indicators and show 
how they have become entrenched tax evasion practices in Kabul and 
Kandahar.  
3.1. Unreported Transactions  
Interviews indicate a consensus that accurate estimates on the volume 
of illegal finance in Afghanistan have not been provided by any relevant 
governmental authority or other competent agencies. A key reason cited 
by an interviewee for the lack of such data is the very nature of illegal 
money: they are unreported, making it extremely difficult to measure. 
That said, according to the Ministry of Finance (MoF), of all the financial 
flows in Afghanistan, only about 35% are legitimate. As such, 
approximately 65% of the funds are illegally earned, transferred, or 
utilized. Gray and Adbi report that this 65% includes illegal money linked 
to money laundering, tax evasion, corruption/bribery, and lost customs 
revenues.29 
The Global Financial Index (GFI) reports that Afghanistan’s cumulative 
illegal outflows from 2003-2012 was USD 2.22 billion, with an average 
annual illegal outflow of USD 222 million per year.30 However, these 
figures are very conservative because GFI assigned a value of zero to 
Afghanistan’s annual illegal outflows from 2007 to 2012. On the contrary, 
 
28   Hasan Kakar, Government and society in Afghanistan (Austin: University of Texas 
Press, 1979), 73-5. 
29  Timothy Gray, Ezatullah Adib, “Curbing illicit financial flows in Afghanistan 
Kabul”, Integrity Watch Afghanistan (2015). 
30  Global Financial Integrity, “Anonymous Companies” (2015).  Available online at: 
 <http://www.gfintegrity.org/issue/anonymous-companies> (Last accessed: 
11.12.2019). 
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Integrity Watch Afghanistan (IWA) reports that the USD 222 million 
estimate does not pick up movements of bulk cash, the mispricing of 
services, or many types of money laundering.31  
Afghanistan’s rising illegal money linked to increased opium production 
and drug trafficking are also not captured in GFI’s estimate. As such, 
according to Gray and Adib, the total amount of illegal money from 
Afghanistan is likely significantly higher than GFI’s estimate of USD 222 
million per year.32  
The Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) in 
2012 reported that in terms of bulk cash movement, USD 4.5 billion was 
taken out of the Hamid Karzai International Airport (HKIA) in 2011 
alone.33 While large cash movements are typical in Afghanistan, given the 
country’s cash-based economy, these bulk cash flows raise the risk of 
money laundering and bulk cash smuggling—tools often used to finance 
terrorist, narcotics, and other illicit operations.  
Similarly, in 2019 SIGAR reported the prevalence of fraudulent and 
falsified receipts showing inflated prices on a disproportionate number 
of subcontracts submitted by Hikmatullah Shadman, a young Afghan 
who operated several companies, for payment for delivery of fuel that 
was never delivered to the US military units but was in fact sold on 
Kandahar’s black market.34 The payment of kickbacks in cash to facilitate 
the award of the fuel delivery subcontracts was also uncovered by SIGAR 
reinforcing the view that unreported bulk cash flows continue to flow 
within the Afghan economy.35 
3.2. Lack of Regulation  
A major challenge to disrupting the movement of illegal money in Kabul 
and Kandahar is the lack of regulation or control of the informal financial 
sector (hawala) which controls the vast majority (estimated at 90%) of 
financial flows within Afghanistan and transfers to foreign countries. 
This has also been previously confirmed by Rai.36  
 
31  Integrity Watch Afghanistan (2015). 
32  Gray and Adib, 2015.  
33  SIGAR (2012). 
34  SIGAR, “Quarterly Report to the United States Congress” (2019).  Available 
online at: <https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/quarterlyreports/2019-04-30qr.pdf> (Last 
accessed: 11.12.2019). 
35  Ibid. 
36  Rai, 2017.  
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MoF has reported that the Da Afghanistan Bank (DAB) has issued 
regulations to govern the informal Money Service Provider (MSP) – 
hawala – sector; however, the majority of hawaladars operate without 
licenses and do not comply with the DAB regulations.37 With little trust 
in the formal banking system, the hawala emerged as the most 
convenient and reliable system for moving funds in and out of the 
country.  
Hawala, explains Rai, is unlike any formal institution, it is based on mutual 
trust and an extensive network of family and regional affiliations.38 Such 
a close-knit community of money exchange dealers or hawaladars 
provide a reliable, timely and cost-effective alternative to the traditional 
banking and financial establishments which are otherwise perceived as 
inadequate and corrupt. 
3.3. No Thresholds on Funds Transfer 
Interviews revealed that there is no limit on the volume of fund transfers 
the hawaladars can transfer; individually or severally. Since the fall of the 
Taliban regime, the volume of financial flows through the hawala system 
has grown significantly.39 NGOs alone are estimated to have channelled 
at least US$200 million in emergency, relief, and development funding 
through the hawala system.40 Maimbo’s findings also showed that single 
transactions in excess of US$500,000, especially between Peshawar in 
Pakistan and Kabul, were not uncommon. The larger international aid 
institutions and NGOs have made individual transactions of 
US$1,000,000. Because there are limited storage facilities in Kabul for 
large sums of money, however, the majority of organizations remit funds 
through the hawala system in smaller amounts of US$100,000 to 
$200,000. The smaller organizations regularly remit US$20,000 to 
$30,000 to meet operational expenses. Internally, the funds remitted to 
the provinces tend to be smaller, ranging from US$10,000 to $20,000.  
Owing to security concerns, these hawala transactions are made only 
when the regional offices have ready invoices for payment.41 A journalist 
interviewed gave an example of the flows of illegal money between local 
 
37  Ministry of Finance “Annual Performance Report” Afghanistan (2015).   
38  Rai, 2017. 
39  EastWest Institute “Afghan Narcotrafficking. Illicit Financial Flows” Joint US-
Russia Working Group on Afghan Narcotrafficking (2017). 
40  Maimbo, 2003. 
41  Ibid.  
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hawala dealers and within the region trading in narcotics. The hawala 
operator in Kandahar offers a diverse range of services: money 
exchange, transfer of funds, microfinance and limited deposit taking. 
Their capital base depends both on legal and illegal trade in goods and 
opium. It was revealed that a drug trafficker would instruct the 
hawaladar to purchase goods on his behalf from the hawaladar’s 
network in the diaspora and import them into the country where the 
goods would be sold at a profit, thereby integrating the proceeds into 
the economy. 
3.4. Smuggling 
According to a confidential assessment of Afghan finances by the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and also reported by Rosenberg,42 
the Afghan government’s financial distress in 2013 was caused by 
widespread tax evasion and smuggling abetted by government officials 
and the increasing theft of customs revenues by provincial governors. 
Government officers interviewed revealed that the discretionary powers 
enjoyed by custom officials makes them vulnerable to many forms of 
corruption, from the payment of informal facilitation to permit 
smuggling of goods, to large scale fraud and other serious criminal 
activities. Poor infrastructure, lack of automation of customs procedures 
and informality at the border contributes to smuggling and evading 
customs due to the lack of transparency and accountability.  
3.5. Weak Implementation of Reporting Standards 
Weak implementation on the part of state authorities in establishing 
reporting and controlling standards allows several industries like the 
telecommunication, extractive and logistics to misappropriate their 
revenues.  
Several large scale misappropriation and under-reporting of revenue 
across industries such as construction have been found, wherein the 
political elites consistently report no income. Similarly, the extractive 
industries from the regions of Badakshan to Nangarhar, for example, pay 
no royalties or taxes on mining activities for stones such as lapis and 
emeralds.43  
 
42  Rosenberg, 2013. 
43  Integrity Watch Afghanistan (2015). 
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3.6. Absence of Information on Ownership 
Tax evasion in Afghanistan also permeates the corporate sector. For 
example, the now defunct Afghanistan Investment Support Agency 
(AISA) probed an international logistics firm catering to American 
soldiers stationed in Afghanistan, which owed a total of $6 million to the 
Afghan government in unpaid taxes. The Audit report of SIGAR 
concluded that almost “43 contractors expanding US government 
efforts in Afghanistan” were found guilty of tax evasion, where a 
combined penalty of $921 million was levied by the Afghan MoF.44 
According to AfghanZariza, tax evasion by foreign companies in 
Afghanistan is often associated with the absence of information on 
operations and ownership. Though a total of 40,000 national and 
international companies were registered with the then AISA, a large 
number of firms were still unaccounted for, and thus found it easy to 
evade taxes.45 
3.7. Trade in Narcotics 
The UNODC reports that trade in narcotics is one of the most prominent 
sources of funds for illegal money in Afghanistan. The Financial Action 
Task Force (FATF), an international anti-money-laundering body, has 
categorized Afghanistan as the origin country of drugs, with Kyrgyzstan 
and Tajikistan often acting as consumption and transit countries for the 
drugs to Europe, as well as an intermediary for handling finance.46 
Consumers in Europe provide the funds back to Afghanistan while 
Pakistan operates as a consumption country as well as a financial center 
for drug money. Thompson, who has researched this process and 
conducted extensive fieldwork in Afghanistan, notes that Dubai 
operates as a central ‘clearing house’ for many of these transactions.47 
 
44  SIGAR, “Taxes: Afghan Government Has Levied Nearly a Billion Dollars in 
Business taxes on Contractors Supporting US Government Efforts in 
Afghanistan Audit 13-8” (2013). Available online at:  
<https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/audits/2013-05-14-audit-13-8.pdf> (Last accessed: 
11.12.2019). 
45  AfghanZariza (2014). 
46  FATF, “Improving Global AML/CFT Compliance: On-going process,” (Paris: FATF, 
2014). 
<http://www.fatfgafi.org/media/fatf/documents/statements/Compliance-14-
February-2014.pdf> (Last accessed: 11.12.2019).  
47 Edwina Thompson (n.d), “The Nexus of Drug Trafficking and Hawala in 
Afghanistan”, in Doris Buddenberg and William a Byrd (eds), ‘Afghanistan’s Drug 
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FATF also refers to illicit activities of import–export companies 
registered in China that may transfer funds into Afghanistan, as well as 
hawaladars in Afghanistan controlling import–export companies to 
transfer money to recipients in China.48 This is likely to be part of trade-
based money-laundering schemes. Some transactions may show under- 
or over-invoicing, or simply use fictitious invoices, to avoid customs 
duties in both countries. This is a way to move illicit payments for drugs 
out of the country, or they may be used to balance debts between 
hawaladars.49 
3.8. Corruption  
Corruption among the political elites in Afghanistan plays a significant 
role in earning and transferring illegal money. The prevalence of illegal 
money is enabled by the central government that is too weak to 
challenge the decentralized power elites who generate and benefit from 
it.50 Lain et al also contend that the private sector tends to play a dual 
role in earning, acquiring or transferring illegal money. On the one hand, 
businesses participate in the underground economies by evading taxes 
or applicable regulations. This is particularly relevant to Afghanistan. On 
the other hand, private sector actors may knowingly or unknowingly 
provide opportunities for laundering the proceeds of crime, as in the 
property sector. In Afghanistan and Pakistan, much of the illicit finance 
is believed to be invested in Dubai property.51 
Further, administrative bodies, such as customs and tax authorities, and 
law enforcement agencies, such as the border force and police, play a 
pivotal role in moving illegal money in most focus countries. Bribery and 
corruption are particularly prevalent on borders, such as the 
Afghanistan–Tajikistan border, where it is believed that some border 
guards, immigration and customs officials are directly engaged in the 
drug trade.52  
 
Industry: Structure, Functioning, Dynamics, and Implications for Counter-Narcotics 
Policy’, UNODC and World Bank, 155–88. 
48  FATF (2014). 
49  Ibid. 
50  Sarah Lain, Haylea Campbell, Anton Moiseienko, Veerle Nouwens and Inês Sofia 
de Oliveira, “Illicit Financial Flows and Corruption in Asia,” RUSI Occasional Paper 
(2017). 
51  Lain et al, Thompson (n.d.) (2017). 
52  Filippo De Danieli, “Counter-Narcotics Policies in Tajikistan and their Impact on 
State-Building”, in John Heathershaw and Edmund Herzig (eds), The 
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It was reported by Lain et al that bribes are not necessarily seen as a 
corrupt act in Afghanistan. This was also confirmed by the interviews 
conducted. Paying a bribe is often the path of least resistance to getting 
things done. For example, the legal way to get things done on the border 
with Afghanistan is time consuming and expensive, and paying bribes 
speeds the process up, although only marginally.53  
Pajhwok Afghan News statistics show that since the fiscal year 2015 until 
May 2017, among every 10 middle level taxpayers, six evade taxes. Some 
of the taxpayers might have been evading tax while some might have 
been inactive.54 Pajhwok lists administrative corruption, misuse of 
authority or use of influence, power and lack of awareness about the law 
as the main reasons behind the non-payment of taxes. Pajhwok’s 
investigations revealed that some business markets owned by members 
of parliament or people who have close ties with government and tribal 
elders refused to pay taxes: “Some show them gun bullets and others 
offer bribe in order not to ask them for tax. They are so powerful that they 
can challenge our president and minister who according to them cannot 
ask them for tax”.55 
Previously, the Afghan Business had cited an investigative report by 1TV 
which claimed that 15 out of 300 major companies in Afghanistan refused 
to pay taxes. The report claimed that these companies have tried to 
evade tax by using diplomatic channels and relying upon the NATO 
command to pressurize the government not to prosecute them.56 The 
companies own a total of USD 7,307,000 in taxes, claims the report. It 
further adds that a number of foreign private security companies owe 
the government between USD 4-10mn each in taxes. This comes after 
the Afghan government accused U.S. military’s main food supplier in 
Afghanistan, Supreme Foodservice GmBH for operating in Afghanistan 
illegally and refusing to pay taxes to the government. Supreme, on the 
other hand, says it is not engaging in any commercial activity in 
Afghanistan that should make it liable for taxes. According to the Large 
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Taxpayer Office (LTO) officials, Supreme was engaged in 50 contracts in 
Afghanistan, of which 15 were main contracts and exempted from tax. 
However, the remaining 35 contracts were subsidiary contacts that 
made the company eligible for tax payments to the government.57 
3.9. Insiders  
The US Department of State Bureau for International Narcotics and Law 
Enforcement Affairs reports that in some cases in Afghanistan, there are 
reports of financial institutions captured by criminal interests. The most 
well-known example of this is the Kabul Bank scandal, where the bank’s 
founder and its former Chief Executive were sentenced to five years’ 
imprisonment after being convicted of stealing $810 million from the 
bank.58 Also convicted were a number of the bank’s employees, as well 
as some officials of the DAB and other state institutions.  
Funds had been embezzled from the Bank by means of fraudulent insider 
loans and overpayments for goods and services, with much of the money 
transferred to Dubai.59 President Ghani reopened the investigation into 
the Kabul Bank fraud by presidential decree two days after his 
inauguration. He had fought the election on an anti-corruption platform 
and the case was of symbolic importance, especially since Mahmood 
Karzai, the brother of Afghanistan’s former president, was among the 
alleged beneficiaries of the fraud.  
3.10. Technology  
Afghans have been moving money through value transfer services 
(MVTS) since the eighth century and the system is well established and 
used in all parts of the country. Its low cost, speed, convenience and 
accessibility are all factors that ensure that MVTS will continue to be 
popular, even in urban areas where there are banks.60 Although the 
volume of transactions that pass through the MVTS system in 
Afghanistan is significant, FinTRACA has only been able to begin 
registering MVTS operators in 2007. By March 2012, the FinTRACA had 
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registered and licensed over 640 MVTS operators that account for about 
40% of the total volume of business.61 As of April 2014, over 1,000 MVTS 
operators were registered (compared to around 800 operators in the 
beginning of 2013).  
More needs to be done for MVTs to be regulated since the majority of 
countries identified as consumer markets of Afghan opium, indicate that 
drug-related money is being transferred via MVTs to Afghanistan 
through intermediate countries, primarily: Pakistan, Iran, UAE and China. 
Funds are transferred via the banking system to an intermediate country 
or countries, which act as ‘gateways’ for money flows. Another service 
(mostly MVTS and cash couriers) then facilitates payment into 
Afghanistan. There are also indications that the majority of funds move 
from Afghanistan to Dubai, which acts as the region’s financial center for 
most of the legitimate trade.62 
3.11.  Money Laundering 
In 2015, the profits generated by Afghanistan's illicit economy were 
worth more than $1 billion. Drug trafficking, smuggling, unregulated 
trade, and fraud in procurement contracts are encumbering the 
country's economic development and funding the terrorist groups that 
undermine its stability. Accordingly, money laundering plays a crucial 
role in supporting this criminality. Yet over the past decade, the 
government has not been able to do much to crack down on it and of 
the many clear cases of the practice that have appeared, only a few have 
been prosecuted. The problem is a product of several factors, including 
lax financial and customs controls, inadequate expertise in the Afghan 
government, high-level opposition to change, and weak enforcement 
mechanisms.63 
3.12. Underground and Informal Economy 
Most of the Afghan economic activity is informal, and data provided by 
the MoF suggest that only 35% of the financial flows within the country 
are legal. Unregulated cash transactions and remittances through the 
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country's traditional money transfer system, hawala, are the rule.64 
According to FATF, more than half of all transactions in Afghanistan 
involve hawala brokers.65 Ordinary Afghans do not have many other 
options because although the country's banking sector has grown 
significantly in recent years, most commercial banks are still 
concentrated in cities. For many Afghans, hawala brokers, whose 
services often leave no paper trail, provide services that are cheaper and 
more convenient than their counterparts in the official banking sector.66 
Drug-related financial flows bear serious consequences for Afghanistan, 
including activities ranging from funding terrorism and supporting 
criminal enterprises to nurturing corruption, undermining the rule of law, 
impeding economic development and depriving the state of desperately 
needed revenue and resources, among others. Transgressing various 
division lines, these financial flows bring together in a single network 
state officials and insurgents, poor farmers and rich landlords, the 
fighters of competing insurgent groups and residents of competing 
regional and non-regional states. Thus, they form part of the Afghan and 
regional underground economy, which remains non-transparent and 
poorly studied.67 
4. National and International Initiatives taken to Curb Tax Evasion  
Despite these grim statistics on tax evasion practices, Afghanistan has 
put in place a tax administration and collection structure. It has enacted 
legislation, regulations and policies on finance, taxation, corporations, 
banks and financial institutions including the Afghan hawala markets and 
informal sector in order to streamline the Afghan tax system. The 
government has attempted to put in place international standards to 
assess the level of tax compliance and tax management. It has striven to 
ensure the effectiveness of the Afghan revenue authority and its 
competencies and it has also established the corporate tax structure for 
various industries such as the telecommunication, construction, trading 
and extractives sector. In addition, the government has identified the 
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key transactions that corporations in those industries are involved in to 
assess its tax base. All this is summarized in the next section.  
4.1. National Level Initiatives 
Almost all state institutions had deteriorated or been distorted in 
Afghanistan prior to the ousting of the Taliban in 2001. This included the 
tax system which was fragmented between tribal leaders and state 
institutions. In order to claim back fiscal legitimacy, the Afghan 
government began a series of tax reforms. The entry of the international 
community into Afghanistan also fronted public finance as one of the 
first institutions to be addressed in the post conflict state.  
Some of the first actions included re-establishing and staffing up the 
MoF, introducing a new tax legislative framework, and building the 
Afghanistan Revenue Department (ARD) and hence the 
institutionalization of tax as a means to fund the state and public 
services.68 This had the effect of removing tax collection powers from 
the tribal leaders. 
In building the domestic tax system, the Afghan government introduced 
a number of simplified taxes, including a turnover tax (Business Receipt 
Tax or BRT) and withholding tax on wages, rent and contracts. The BRT 
was considered more feasible than a modern corporate income tax, 
given the underdeveloped state of the economy and low capacity of the 
ARD.  
The ARD established an official presence in Kabul and Kandahar as well 
as in other provincial offices (known as Mastofiats) around the country 
reporting to the Director General of Administration.69 Following this, the 
ARD established Large Taxpayer Office (LTO), Medium Taxpayers Office 
(MTO) and the Small Taxpayer Office (STO) in Kabul and Kandahar. This 
taxpayer segmentation is meant to assist the ARD provide better 
services to these taxpayers and encouraging voluntary taxpayer 
compliance. At the same time, the ARD has trained many staff in audit, 
taxpayer services, and general tax administration and has installed a 
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new, commercial off-the-shelf IT tax administration system that 
supports streamlined processes and procedures.70  
In order to streamline the tax collection process, the MoF established a 
Fiscal Policy Unit, which is mostly focused on macroeconomic 
programmes and medium-term budgeting, but is also responsible for 
monitoring and reviewing fiscal, including tax, policy and conducting tax 
analyses and developing tax policy reform recommendations.71 
Following from this, Afghanistan enacted an Income Tax Law in 2009, 
covering individuals and companies, which is much more consistent with 
international tax practice. The Afghan government in 2015 also drafted a 
new Value Added Tax (VAT) law to progressively replace the BRT 
through the lowering of the VAT registration threshold over time and the 
Tax Administration Law.  
4.2. International Law Initiatives  
Afghanistan has taken a number of measures to combat against tax 
evasion. In 2004, the Afghan state passed the Anti- Money Laundering 
(AML) and Proceeds of Crime Law, on which the Financial Transactions 
and Reports Analysis Center of Afghanistan (FinTRACA), a financial 
intelligence unit (FIU), was established.72 Following long delays due to 
parliamentary inaction, suggesting weak rather than genuine political 
will, Afghanistan passed new AML/Combating the Financing of Terrorism 
(CFT) laws in 2014, but the process of implementing regulations and 
actual enforcement practices remain slow. The notable progress made 
with this legislation is that money laundering is properly criminalized and 
adequate provisions regarding the seizure and confiscation of crime 
proceeds as a result of cross border smuggling, trading in narcotics, 
corruption through the use of the hawala informal market are included.  
In order to extract the taxes not paid by various corporations, the 
Afghan Business reports that a special commission which comprises the 
MoF, the Ministry of Justice (MoJ) and the Attorney General’s Office was 
formed to resolve disputes with large companies that owe taxes to the 
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Afghan government.73 MoF’s then head of treasury department, Gul 
Maqsood Sabit, had revealed that three large companies owe 
approximately 15bn AFN in back-taxes to the Afghan government. Sabit 
said the special commission was formed to settle issues the treasury 
department had with various companies. According to the official, 10% of 
the 500 large businesses registered with the Afghan government were 
alleged to be evading taxes to varying extents. Sabit added that the 
Ministry is facilitating installment-based payment plans to companies 
that lack the capacity to pay taxes right away, while those who were 
refusing to pay taxes due were supposed to face legal action.74 
Despite these measures that have been put in place, an interview with 
an agent of a private company revealed that all sorts of cash and other 
flows take place unmonitored and unchecked due to geography 
(especially the Afghanistan-Pakistan border), resource constraints, 
unclear customs rules on dealing with suspicious transactions and the 
country’s porous international borders. The US Department of State 
Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs has also 
noted that even HKIA does not have proper controls for all passengers 
and this in turn risks trade-based money laundering.75 
Despite laws and institutions to control money laundering, terrorism 
financing and other illicit flows introduced, they are proving ineffective 
in light of the uncontained underground economy, corruption, porous 
borders and poor infrastructure. Similarly, Passas pointed out that “new 
laws drafted with foreign assistance constitute another layer in need of 
harmonization.76 However, efforts to fight financial crime and corruption 
in the country are inconsistent, ad hoc, and discriminatory. The 
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normative dissonance resulting from this lack of coordination—along 
with the judicial exclusion of certain groups, dysfunctional governance, 
corruption, turmoil and insecurity in the midst of foreign involvement—
have given rise to continued drug trafficking and terrorism.” 
Overall Afghanistan’s economy has many features commonly associated 
with a low tax base; such as (i) extremely low level of development; (ii) 
a large informal sector implying a narrow tax base; (iii) the dominance of 
tribal leaders; and (iv) capacity constraints hindering the ability of the 
government to collect taxes and of taxpayers to comply with tax 
regulations. Revenue mobilization is further complicated by the large 
opium economy that cannot be taxed directly, the need to consolidate 
government control throughout the country, and heavy reliance on aid 
funds that are exempt from taxation.  
5. Key Findings and Recommendations  
The journalists from Kabul and Kandahar who were interviewed stated 
that a number of important ministries and institutions either do not view 
tax evasion as a significant challenge or are unaware of the extent of the 
problem in the country. Accordingly, raising awareness and training 
governmental institutions, agencies, and relevant authorities on tax 
evasion issues and related measures must therefore, be a priority. In 
addition, the declaration system and money laundering controls for 
cross-border transportation of currency and bearer negotiable 
instruments need to be rigorously enforced.  
One interviewee referred to the 2013 SIGAR report criticising 
government’s action of installing bulk currency counters at the HKIA to 
counter the risk of money laundering and bulk cash smuggling. This 
interviewee felt that these machines are not used for their intended 
purposes. According to him, in the case of Very Important Persons 
(VIPs), the main customs screenings or use of bulk currency counters are 
completely ignored. Thus, another needed change is the reduction in the 
limit on the amount of currency persons travelling outside of 
Afghanistan are required to declare from $20,000 to $10,000 was a 
suggestion the interviewee made.  
Given the cash-based nature of Afghanistan’s economy, strict 
enforcement of the declaration system and anti-money laundering 
measures along Afghanistan’s porous crossings is critical to curbing tax 
evasion. 
 Latif (2019) 
165 
Laws regarding establishing beneficial ownership of corporations have 
not been implemented and control of legal persons in Afghanistan is 
opaque. The Afghanistan Central Business Registry (ACBR) of the 
Ministry of Industries and Commerce (MoIC) should be required to 
collect information on beneficial ownership of all registered business 
entities, trusts and foundations. Any organization not fulfilling such 
requirements of the ACBR should be prohibited from conducting 
business, opening a bank account or transferring funds within or outside 
the country, by whatever means. This would reduce instances of tax 
evasion and provide the government with an accurate register of the 
owner of corporations liable for tax. 
The absence of adequate state structures has led to the misuse of 
political influence along with the emergence of provincial governors, 
which facilitates tax collection in their respective regions, increasing the 
risk of revenue loss.77 Unregulated hawaladars have not been brought 
under the ambit of the financial system to track informal transactions 
through the hawala system and to curb tax evasion.  
A publicly accessible ‘beneficial owner’ registry would aid in establishing 
transparency standards for entities in Afghanistan. This registry should 
publish, but not be limited to, information on the natural persons, 
related parties, shareholders and stakeholders of legal entities, including 
companies, trusts or foundations. A registry with details on the account 
of payments made by a legal entity, the royalties and incentives received, 
especially for contracts in the extractives sector, and the licensing of 
assets offered to a legal entity to scrutinize any misreporting on 
revenues should also be maintained. Furthermore, bringing 
transparency in foreign aid declaration by donors will discourage 
companies from escaping their tax obligations and report on activities. 
Speaking to government officers in Kabul and Kandahar, it was 
expressed that it is worth considering ways to leverage hawala 
information nodes and willingness of participants to collaborate with 
authorities in order to minimize tax evasion. Hawala, the government 
officers explained is a “headache” for controllers and bank compliance 
officers, but it is also a resource for risk analysis, monitoring, intelligence 
gathering and investigations. Outreach and good connections within 
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hawala networks provide unique and valuable insights into otherwise 
non-observable shady networks and operations.  
According to them, it is a problem but also a solution. The EastWest 
Institute has also proposed that all international financial centers, that 
currently serve as major transit points and hubs for cash and other assets 
flowing out of Afghanistan, should implement policies that enable their 
own, other countries’ and/or international regulating bodies’ counter-
narcotics financial investigators to audit cash and assets and individuals 
conducting these transactions in a manner consistent with international 
AML/CFT standards (e.g. FATF recommendations and best practices 
guidance).78  
Further, it recommends that customs, transit and port authorities in 
Pakistan, Iran and the UAE should develop stronger cooperation with 
each other, as well as other involved actors, to gather documentation on 
goods transported to and from Afghanistan and to assemble high-quality 
trade data on volumes, types of goods and services, values, end use and 
destination, etc.79 This move would help furnish credible information 
about Afghanistan’s trade partners and would facilitate the identifica-
tion of payment routes and types critical to curb illegal movement of 
money. 
An interview with a freelance journalist in Kabul also revealed that 
digitalization had the scope to reduce tax evasion, especially if 
implemented at the border and for self-assessment of tax. The 
interviewee argued that tribal leaders sometimes bully taxpayers and 
blackmail government, a modernized tax system would bypass these 
instances of intermediaries necessary to collect taxes. According to him 
‘there should be no talk of so-called paper money, if the tax cyst is 
digitized this would be better for the citizen to be able to hand over his 
tax at the earliest opportunity’.  
Another Kandahar based interviewee also confirmed the hostile 
approach taken by tribal leaders towards payment of taxes or charges. 
According to the interviewee “these leaders; both tribal as well as 
politicians, have been accused of even not paying electricity bills. 
Electricity bills worth millions of Afs have not been paid by political 
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figures. Since they also engage in business, they are foremost in evading 
customs duties as well”.  
Reports prepared by an investigative journalist interviewed showed that 
tax collection from holding wedding parties, which are by law required 
to remit 5% of the income received, are not collected by the government. 
The duty lies with the MTO and corruption plays a significant role in the 
non-payment of this tax. An interview with an NGO representative also 
confirmed the high level of corruption within the government that leads 
to the erosion of the tax base. According to this interviewee, large scale 
tax evasion occurs within the Customs Department for which private 
sector companies are largely to blame. 
An interviewee representing the private sector in Kabul argued that 
Afghanistan’s corporate tax rate of 20% was excessively high and 
recommended a reduced rate of between 2-4% to prevent tax evasion. 
Another explained that most foreign companies do not pay taxes saying 
that they pay tax in their own countries. “I believe Afghanistan is an 
independent country; anyone earning income in Afghanistan should 
obey Afghanistan’s laws. Currently, the law isn’t implemented on these 
foreign companies because they have the power. They also pay bribes to 
reduce the taxable amount”. 
An authorized representative of a company from the private sector in 
Kandahar during the interview discussed how government itself abuses 
the tax system. According to him “politicians wield their authority to 
evade tax payment. They import goods illegally and do not pay customs 
duty”.  
Another interviewee from a different company also complained that the 
lack of punitive laws in punishing against payment of customs has 
resulted in its wide scale spread. According to him: 
  
Most Afghans don’t have positive opinions about tax. They don’t 
have positive opinion due to a number of reasons. First reason is lack 
of confidence in government. For example, I see people and I talk to 
them and they ask about the 10% tax on telephone credit cards. 
Since SIM cards aren’t registered, companies have more customers. 
Due to lack of a proper mechanism, people are doubtful whether 
the 10% tax goes to the pockets of telecommunication companies or 
to the account of government to be spend for development. Lack 
of confidence in government is one of the main reasons. It has many 
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reasons. Lack of awareness. Afghans have witnessed decades of 
war and they don’t know where the money taken out from their 
pockets is spent. They should be given awareness. People should be 
given awareness by the government that the tax they are paying is 
spent for the future of their kids. People should pay taxes. They 
should willingly pay taxes. Another reason is the poverty of people. 
Another reason is existence of corrupt officials among high ranking 
government officials. For example, Da Brishna Shirkat announces on 
its site that high ranking officials such as MPs don’t pay their 
electricity bills. People think they pay their bills on time while their 
law makers violate the laws they make. They result in tax evasion 
and non-payment of taxes. 
 
Accordingly, the proposed recommendations that can be made resulting 
from the findings are as follow:  
- Prevent tribal leaders and others from collecting tax and 
imposing fees by enacting laws criminalizing such action.  
- Digitalize the entire tax structure and require all eligible 
taxpayers to acquire a mandatory personal identification 
number for tax purposes and file returns online using the same. 
- Attribute criminal liability to corporations for the criminal acts 
of their employees, agents or those who provide services for or 
on their behalf in evading customs. 
- Remove from office and/or penalize government officials 
involved in tax evasion, corruption, smuggling and avoiding 
payment of or providing favor to those evading taxes and 
customs duty. 
- Train the judiciary and law enforcement authorities on money 
laundering trends and investigations. 
- Enhance transparency of beneficial ownership and the control 
structure of legal persons/organizations. 
- Provide support and technical assistance to the DAB by 
resuming collaboration with the international community. 
- Empower and support FinTRACA and other relevant institutions 
involved in tax policy making and enforcement. 
- Increase national coordination and cooperation among 
relevant ministries, agencies, and authorities to detect, 
monitor, trace and curb tax evasion. 
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- Ensure strict compliance with and enforcement of the laws, 
regulations and circulars against MSPs (hawaladars). 
- Punitive sanctions on evasion of taxes and customs duty and all 
other violation of the laws regulating the financial sector. 
- Execute agreements for data and information sharing in 
relation to financial assets and bank accounts of Afghan 
nationals with countries that are deemed to be safe havens for 
tax evaders including UAE, Turkey, and Uzbekistan.  
